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Multicasting is an eﬃcient method for transmission and routing of packets to multiple destinations using fewer network resources.
Along with widespread deployment of wireless networks, secure multicast over wireless networks is an important and challenging
goal. In this paper, we extend the scope of a recent new key distribution scheme to a security framework that oﬀers a novel
solution for secure multicast over IPv6 wireless networks. Our key management framework includes two scenarios for securely
distributing the group key and rekey messages for joining and leaving a mobile host in secure multicast group. In addition, we
perform the security analysis and provide performance comparisons between our approach and two recently published scenarios.
The benefits of our proposed techniques are that they minimize the number of transmissions required to rekey the multicast group
and impose minimal storage requirements on the multicast group. In addition, our proposed schemes are also very desirable from
the viewpoint of transmission bandwidth savings since an eﬃcient rekeying mechanism is provided for membership changes and
they significantly reduce the required bandwidth due to key updating in mobile networks. Moreover, they achieve the security and
scalability requirements in wireless networks.
Copyright © 2006 W. Aye and M. U. Siddiqi. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Multicast communication has been at the center of interest
in the area of Internet activities for commercial, military, dis-
tributed, and group-based applications. A multicast address
is designed to enable the delivery of datagrams to a set of
hosts configured as members of a multicast group in various
scattered subnetworks [1]. A local multicast router period-
ically sends the membership query messages using MLDv2
[2] for IPv6 in a multicast group. Any host that wishes to
join the group replies with a membership report message. A
multicast router periodically gathers and manages the mem-
bership report messages and then sends a join message to
the upstream-multicast routers. A multicast branch is con-
structed between two adjacent multicast routers based on
multicast membership information. The link of multicast
branches forms the multicast delivery tree. This tree can
be built using diﬀerent techniques between source and re-
ceivers. Most of current researches concentrate on provid-
ing multicast for real-time applications in wired networks
[3, 4].
Along with widespread deployment of wireless networks,
it is believed that a large number of services requested by
mobile users will be multicasted to them from various service
providers. Content and service providers are increasingly in-
terested in supporting multicast communications over wire-
less networks. Businesses can use wireless multicast to dis-
tribute software, news updates, and stock quotes to branch
oﬃces. Wireless multicast becomes a challenging task and
a topic of great interest to Internet service providers. How-
ever, many important issues must be addressed before multi-
cast can be widely deployed, including new business models
for charging wireless customers and for revenue distribution
among providers [5].
The security aspects are as important as performance and
low energy consumption in many wireless applications. For
secure wireless multicasting, we need cryptography and key
management schemes in which cryptographic keys must be
used to encrypt and decrypt messages. The cryptographic
keys must also be recalculated and redistributed upon cer-
tain events such as a member joining and leaving the group.
It must ensure that only authorized participants to the group
may access the distributed keys and group data [6]. For se-
cure multicasting in a wireless environment, we must con-
sider other factors: battery power, bandwidth constraints,
host mobility, loss of packets, and wireless security issues [7].
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The new services on future wireless networks are the lack
of thorough and well-defined security solutions that meet
the challenges posed by wireless networks. We believe that
an integrated approach to security development, which con-
siders both network and application-specific issues, is critical
to facilitating the ultimate deployment of a secure, pervasive
computing infrastructure. In particular, security algorithms
and protocols for wireless computing must be designed to
consider the resource limitations of network nodes, the mo-
bility of network nodes, and the underlying interworking of
wireless networks.
Most researchers focus on two main kinds of wireless
multicasts: multicast for infrastructure-based wireless net-
work and multicast for ad hoc networks. Infrastructure-
based wireless networks involve base stations and switches
in a fixed topology. On the other hand, ad hoc wireless net-
works contain no fixed structure; all network components
are subject to move without any constraints. In this pa-
per, our proposed key management framework focused on
infrastructure-based wireless network.
This paper contains three main contributions. First, we
present our proposed schemes for securely distributing the
group key and rekey messages for joining and leaving a mo-
bile host in secure multicast group over IPv6 wireless net-
work. Our proposed scheme includes (1) group creation, (2)
initial key distribution, (3) new member join, (4) member
leave, (5) handover process, and (6) multicast data distri-
bution. Second, we perform the security analysis regarding
group key security and group data secrecy. Third, we pro-
vide performance comparisons between our approach and
the corresponding scenario in [8].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
outlines the issues of security requirements included in our
approach. The detail explanations of our proposed schemes
and security analysis on them are described in Section 3. The
performance comparisons between our approach and sce-
narios in [8] are provided in Section 4. Concluding remarks
are provided in Section 5.
2. SECURITY AND SCALABILITY REQUIREMENTS IN
WIRELESS NETWORKS
Backward secrecy and forward secrecy are two important se-
curity properties encountered in group key distribution. To
achieve forward and backward secrecy, the group key is up-
dated after each member join and departure event, and the
new key information is distributed to the legitimate group
members. It is important to update and distribute the keys in
a secure, scalable, and reliable way. In this section, we outline
the issues of security and scalability requirements in wireless
multicast. The fundamental services of secure multicast for
wireless networks [6, 9] are as follows.
Authentication
This provides access control to the network by denying ac-
cess to client stations that cannot authenticate properly. This
service addresses the question, “Are only authorized persons
allowed to gain access to my network?”
Confidentiality
It was developed to provide “privacy achieved by a wired net-
work.” The intent was to prevent information compromise
from casual eavesdropping (passive attack). This service, in
general, addresses the question, “Are only authorized persons
allowed to view my data?”
Integrity
This service ensures that messages are not modified in tran-
sit between the wireless clients and the access point in an ac-
tive attack. This service addresses the question, “Is the data
coming into or exiting the network trustworthy—has it been
tampered with?”
Group key secrecy
This property guarantees that it is computationally infeasible
for an adversary to discover any group key.
Backward secrecy
The join user cannot decrypt the content that was sent before
his join.
Forward secrecy
The departure/revoked user cannot decrypt the content that
is sent after his deletion from the group.
1 affects n
This failure occurs when a groupmember aﬀects all the other
members.
1 does not equal n
This failure occurs when a protocol has to deal with each
member separately.
3. OUR APPROACH
Our key management framework includes two scenarios for
secure multicast over wireless network. One is key distri-
bution on decentralized architecture for mobile multicast
(DAMM) and another is key distribution on centralized ar-
chitecture for mobile multicast (CAMM).
During the group initialization, the approach DAMM is
more eﬃcient than CAMM. Moreover, it requires a storage
space less significant than others. On the other hand, CAMM
is more eﬃcient for dynamic groups, because it distributes
the computational cost of rekeying among the whole group.
The CAMM resolves the failure 1 aﬀects n by dividing the
multicast group into subgroups. Each subgroup, managed by
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Figure 1: Multicast enabled delivery path over IPv6 wireless network.
a local controller, has its own key. The subgroups are linked
by intermediate agents for building a virtual group. The in-
termediate agent role is to translate the multicast data dif-
fused by a member within its subgroup to all members of
the virtual group. Consequently, CAMM fits better dynamic
groups. However, it is less eﬃcient for diﬀusion of group data
which undergoes encryption and decryption operations by
the intermediate agents. On the other hand, DAMM is more
eﬃcient for data diﬀusion because it uses only one key shared
among group members. DAMM is also a solution for scala-
bility problems, in particularly for the revocation problem, 1
does not equal n.
Both scenarios include (1) group creation, (2) initial key
distribution, (3) new member join, (4) member leave, (5)
handover process, and (6) multicast data distribution. We
also perform the security analysis regarding group key se-
curity and group data secrecy. In addition, we provide per-
formance comparisons between our approach and the corre-
sponding scenarios in [8].
The multicast enabled delivery path is shown in Figure 1.
The components included in our approach referred to
Figure 1 are multicast key distributor (MKD), service region
agent (SRA), multicast subnet station (MSS), and mobile
hosts (MH).
Multicast key distributor
MKD manages all the access control, accounting, logging,
and key distribution and data traﬃc distribution to a set of
multicast support stations (MSSi). It also distributes the data
encryption key to group members when they subscribe. The
eﬀects of group dynamics and host mobility are confined to
each subnet, thus MKD is free from the rekeying operations
upon join and leave operations.
Service region agent
There is only one SRA in which several subnets form a service
region. SRA is a multicast router and will act as the core on
the multicast delivery tree.
Multicast subnet station
MSS acts as a proxy for the mobile hosts by honestly relaying
the data traﬃc to the mobile hosts and correctly managing
the control traﬃc. There is only one MSS in each subnet that
provides multicast service to all mobile hosts in that subnet.
SRA and MSS are correctly managing the control traﬃc and
they are the multicast listener delivery (MLD) capable IPv6
routers to discover the presence of interested receivers of a
given multicast group. SRA and MSS use the multicast lis-
tener discovery version 2 (MLDv2) (Vida and Costa, 2004)
protocol that allows a host to inform its neighboring routers
of its desire to receive IPv6 multicast transmissions.
Mobile host
MHi are mobile hosts in each subnet. The group dynam-
ics and host mobility are confined to the subnet level. MHi
are connected with MSSi via broadcast, transmission chan-
nel such as air. MHi logically belong to one cell only at any
given instance.
Our approach exploits the physical separation between
the wired and wireless portions of the network. It is di-
vided into two scoped areas. MKD, SRA, and MSS comprise
the wired portion of the network, and MSS and MHi com-
prise the wireless portion of the network shown in Figure 1.
DAMM and CAMMuse the region-based hierarchical multi-
cast routing protocol (RHMoM) [10] on IPv6. In RHMoM,
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a tunnel is built between previous multicast subnet station
(MSSp) and current multicast subnet station (MSS′). This
makes the multicast service interruption time very short be-
cause the tunnel is much shorter than that between the mo-
bile host and its home agent, especially when the mobile host
is far away from its home network. The subnets are also clus-
tered into diﬀerent regions and the multicast delivery tree
will be reconstructed at most one time when mobile host
moves into a new service region, and when a mobile host
moves around all subnets within the same MSS’s region, the
multicast delivery tree will not be reconstructed.
One-to-many multicast applications such as stock quote
exchange systems, scheduled audio/video (a/v) distribution,
and push media have a single sender and multiple simulta-
neous receivers, and transmission is unidirectional from one
sender to many receivers. In this type of application, a sin-
gle sender transmits secret information to a large number of
patrons. Secret information would need to be encrypted and
only paying users should have the decryption keys. One of
the issues that must be addressed in secure sessions is key
distribution, that is, how to securely distribute the keys to
all members of a group. Multicast-based applications such as
video conferencing, Internet broadcasting, and real-time fi-
nance data distribution will play an important role in the fu-
ture of the Internet as continued multicast encourages their
use and deployment. In this paper, we consider a stock ex-
change system as an example of one-to-many large group
communication in which a single sender distributes its stock
quotes to its customers.
3.1. Assumptions on proposed schemes
For both scenarios, we assume that multicast key distributor
(MKD) is colocated with the sender only for the simplifica-
tion purpose. MKD may be a group organizer and has the
right to create the secure groups on Internet.
In our approach, we assume that all members must have
a capability certificate (CC) from the designated certifica-
tion authority (CA) to enforce the group access control and
distribute their public keys securely and keep them initially
through an oﬀ-line method. CA is a trusted third party that
issues certificates for each entity. We assume that all pub-
lic keys of responsible entities involved in our approach had
been registered in the CA. We also assume that MKD and
MSS keep CA’s public key to verify the authenticity of each
mobile node’s certificate.
Our proposed schemes use RSA [11] encryption algo-
rithm for securely distributing the signed TEK and other
keys. RSA is a public key scheme based on security due to the
diﬃculty of factoring large numbers. They also use ECDSA
digital signature [12] scheme whose eﬃciency is superior to
existing signature schemes for signing the broadcast access
key (BAK). For symmetric key encryption, we use IDEA and
MD5 [13] for message integrity. Prior to initial key distri-
bution, each mobile host generates a public and private key
pair using RSA encryption algorithm and publishes the pub-
lic key (n, e) (i.e., it registers its public key in CA) shown
in Algorithm 1. MKD and MSS also generate ECDSA key
(1) Each mobile node generates two large random primes,
p and q [11], of approximately equal size such that their
product n = pq is of the required bit length.
(2) Compute n = pq and (ϕ) phi = (p − 1)(q − 1).
(3) Choose an integer e, 1 < e < ϕ, such that gcd(e,ϕ) = 1.
(4) Compute the secret exponent d, 1 < d < ϕ, such that
ed ≡ 1(modϕ).
(5) The public key is (n, e) and the private key is (n,d). The
values of p, q, and ϕ should also be kept secret.
(i) n is known as the modulus.
(ii) e is known as the public exponent or encryption
exponent.
(iii) d is known as the secret exponent or decryption
exponent.
Algorithm 1: RSA key generation procedures.
(1) Select an elliptic curve E defined over Zp. The number
of points in E(Zp) should be divisible by a large prime
n.
(2) Select a point P ∈ E(Zp) of order n.
(3) Select a statistically unique and unpredictable integer d
in the interval [1,n− 1].
(4) Compute Q = dP.
(5) MSS’s public key is (E,P,n,Q) and private key is d.
Algorithm 2: ECDSA key generation procedures.
pair and publish its public key. The key generation proce-
dures of ECDSA key pair generated by BAKD are shown in
Algorithm 2.
The capability certificate contains entity’s identity, en-
tity’s ECDSA signature public key, or entity’s RSA public key
plus CA’s signature over these. For example, the capability
certificate of mobile host is CCMH = {MH’s Identity, KUMH,
SCA[MH’s Identity, KUMH]}. To achieve the requirements of
secure key distribution, the best solution is to combine the
public and secret key systems in order to optimize the speed
of symmetric key encryption while maintaining the security
of public key encryption.
3.2. DAMM: key distribution algorithms
In this section, we propose the key distribution algorithms
on decentralized architecture for mobile multicast (DAMM)
on IPv6. The physical architecture and components are de-
scribed in Figure 1.
In DAMM, a single group key (TEK) is used at any
time to encrypt the group traﬃc. SRA and MSSi are fully
trusted and delegated by MKD so that they receive the group
key (TEK) and distribute it to mobile hosts in their own
sub-network. Whenever the membership changes within the
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subnets, MSS can play the role of MKD and can create a new
group key (TEKnew). It also accepts or refuses a new mem-
ber within the subnet and notifies the other multicast sub-
net stations of any change in the subnet. We assume that
SRA1 and SRA2 are adjacent, wired, and they are already pre-
authenticated with each other via the secure channel. The no-
tation used in this section is described in Table 1.
3.2.1. Group creation
Group creation is managed by the MKD. MKD is config-
ured with group and access control information. MKD may
be a group organizer and has the right to create the secure
groups on Internet. Before holding a group session, multi-
cast key distributor (MKD) has to prepare the members who
are willing to join the group by other means (e-mail, fax,
phone, post, etc.). MKD holds the group control list (GCL).
MKD sends the updated GCL to all multicast subnet stations
(MSSi).
Whenever a mobile host joins or leaves the multicast
group, GCL is updated. After preparing the member list,
MKD sends the invitation message to all the initial members
and then waits for them to join. Upon receipt of the reply
messages frommembers, MKD starts the initial key distribu-
tion.
The group controllerMKD starts the process of the group
initialization by creating the group key TEK. For simpli-
fication purposes, we assume that every MSS can securely
generate the cryptographic keys. Whenever the membership
changes within the subnets, MSS is delegated by MKD. MSS
can play the role of MKD and can create a new group key
(TEKnew). The MSS also accepts or refuses a new member
within the subnet and notifies the other multicast subnet sta-
tions of any change in the subnet. Then, the group controller
MKD communicates the key TEK to group members via lo-
cal controllers MSS.
(1) Initial key distribution
The multicast key distributor (MKD) starts the process of
the group initialization by creating the traﬃc encryption key
(TEK). For simplification purposes, we assume that every
controller (MSS) can securely generate cryptographic keys.
Then, the MKD communicates the key TEK to group mem-
bers via local controllers (MSS). The decentralized nature of
DAMM uses a single group key (TEK) at any time to encrypt
or decrypt the group traﬃc.
In Step 1, MKD distributes the encrypted message that
includes its signed group key (TEK), its public key, and prior-
ity number of MSS to all multicast subnet stations. In Step 2,
MSS sends the encrypted message that includes its signed se-
cret key and its public key to mobile hosts. Eventually, the
group key (TEK) is forwarded to the legitimate mobile hosts
within the subnets.
Step 1.
MKD⇒MSSi : EPKUMSSi [SKRMKD[TEK], KUMKD,MSSpri].
(1)
Table 1: Notation used in Section 3.
CCMH Capability certificate of mobile host
EPKRMKD Public key encryption with the private key of MKD
EPKUMKD Public key encryption with the public key of MKD
ESSKi Symmetric key encryption with the secret key SKi
f One-way hash function
Id Identifier (IP address)
KC-Msg Key change message
SKR[M] Message M is signed by private key
SEKi Subnet encryption key for multicast subnet station i
SM Secret key from sender to multicast subnet station
SKi Secret key of mobile host i
TEK Traﬃc encryption key
Step 2.
MSSi ⇒MHi : EPKUMHi [SKRMSSi [SKi], KUMSSi],
MSSi ⇒MHi : EPKRMSSi (ESSK1[TEK, MSSpri], . . . ,
ESSKi [TEK, MSSpri]).
(2)
3.2.2. New member join
In join procedure, a local multicast router, MSS periodically
sends membership query messages using multicast listener
discovery (MLDv2) [2] for IPv6. Any host that wishes to
join the group replies with a membership report message. A
multicast router periodically gathers and manages the mem-
bership report messages, and then sends a join message to
the upstream-multicast routers. There are two steps: source
level subscription and subnet-level subscription. There are
two steps for join operation.
Step 1 is concerned with amobile host wishing to become
a member of a multicast group. If the new mobile host wants
to join the multicast group, it sends a join request that in-
cludes its capability certificate withMLDmembership report
to a multicast subnet station (MSS). A mobile host capability
certificate contains MH’s identity and public key.
In Step 2, MSS authenticates the new host’s join request.
If authentication is successful, it generates the new TEK and
shared secret key SK. Then MSS encrypts the TEKnew, the
new shared secret key SKnew, and MSS’s priority with new
mobile host public key, and sends it to a new mobile host.
MSS also encrypts TEKnew with old TEK and multicasts it to
the other multicast subnet stations and to its existing mobile
receivers.
Step 1.
MHnew ⇒MSS : CCMHnew. (3)
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Step 2.
MSS⇒MHnew : EPKUMHnew[TEKnew, SKnew, MSSpri],
MSS⇒MHi, MSSi : ESTEKold [TEKnew].
(4)
3.2.3. Member leave operation
It is possible that a mobile receiver (MHi) may want to leave
from the multicast group either compulsorily or voluntarily.
For both cases, the group keymust be rekeyed. In Step 1,MSS
encrypts the created TEKnew and its priority number with the
old TEK. Next, MSS multicasts this encrypted message only
to the multicast subnet stations and service region agents,
upstream, which are capable to decrypt. To guarantee the for-
ward secrecy, MSS must not forward this message to its mo-
bile receivers (MHi) within its subnetwork. MSS unicasts the
new key TEKnew to them under their respective unique secret
keys (SKi), but not the evicted one shown in Step 2. The pri-
ority number of the local controller (MSS) must be included
in these messages.
An evicted member cannot any more obtain the new
group key because its MSS, which proceed to change the
key (TEK), multicasts the new TEK, downstream, to mem-
bers under their respective unique secret keys, but not to
the evicted one. We assume that the evicted member is only
linked to one subnetwork. Thus, evicted members cannot re-
trieve the new traﬃc encryption key-TEKnew.
Step 1.
MSS⇒MSSi : ESTEKold [TEKnew, MSSpri]. (5)
Step 2.
MSS⇒MHi : ESSK1[TEKnew,MSSpri], . . . ,
ESSKi [TEKnew,MSSpri].
(6)
In order to maintain the synchronization of the use of
data encryption key TEK, all group members use the same
TEK at the same time, join and leave operations can be
buﬀered at a break point. During the membership changes,
all multicast group members may receive many traﬃc en-
cryption keys (TEKs) sent by diﬀerent multicast support sta-
tions (MSSi) at a break point. In order to use the same group
key (TEK) at the same time, group members may choose one
of the group keys coming from the multicast subnet stations
with the highest priority number (the smallest priority num-
ber).
3.2.4. Handover process
Handover process is concerned with a mobile host moves
from one IP network to another shown in Figure 2. In this
case, we combine the protocol RHMoM [10] with our join
procedure (Section 3.2.2) described as follows.
(1) If the mobile host is the first member of desired multi-
cast group in the new subnet, the currentMSS′ builds a
tunnel between the mobile host and the previous mul-













Current network Previous network
Figure 2: Handover process.
and gets the packets from MSSp. At the same time, the
current MSS′ sends an MLD report message to its ser-
vice region agent SRA.
(2) If there are hosts in the subnet that have already been
in the group, the mobile host can get multicast packets
from the current MSS′ without any additional opera-
tions and it is not needed to build a tunnel between the
current MSS′ and previous subnet MSSp. The mobile
host receives the multicast packets by the tunnel and
it sends an MLD group report messages to the MSS′
on the current network to start to rejoin the proce-
dure (using the same member join procedure referred
to Section 3.2.2).
(3) After receiving the multicast packets directly from the
MSS′, the tunnel will be removed.
3.2.5. Multicast data distribution
Message plus concatenated hash code is encrypted using
TEK-ESTEK[M ‖ H(M)] by the sender. The sender sends this
encrypted message to multicast support stations and MSSi
then forward it to their mobile hosts. All mobile receivers of
the multicast group with TEK can decrypt the multicast data.
In this case, the hash code provides the structure required to
achieve authentication. Because encryption is applied to the
entire message plus hash code and confidentiality is also pro-
vided since the sender and mobile hosts share the secret key,
the message must have come from sender.
DAMM’s keys assigned to MKD, MSS, and MH are
shown in Table 2.
3.2.6. Security analysis on DAMM
In this section, we discuss group key security and group data
secrecy on decentralized architecture for mobile multicast
(DAMM).
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Table 2: DAMM assigned keys.
Keys Owner Shared user
TEK, KUMKD MKD MSS
TEK, KUMKD MKD MHi
KUMSS MSS MKD
SKi MSS MH
(1) Group key security
During the traﬃc data encryption key (TEK) distribu-
tion phase in Section 3.2.1(1), an opponent may substitute
the encrypted message—EPKUMSSi [SKRMKD [TEK], KUMKD,
MSSpri]. However, the opponent would be extremely diﬃcult
to alter the message without knowing the MSS’s private key
and only MKD could create the signed TEK-SKRMKD[TEK]. In
addition, traﬃc data encryption key (TEK) is providing both
the authentication function and confidentiality by a double
use of the public key scheme. Thus, this attack fails.
A new join member cannot obtain the old TEK key be-
cause its MSSi updates the traﬃc data encryption key (TEK).
MSSi then encrypts TEKnew, secret key (SKnew) and MSS’s
priority number with the new mobile host’s public key—
EPKUMHnew[TEKnew, SKnew, MSSpri] and sends it to the new
mobile host. Then MSSi multicasts the encrypted key change
message—ESTEKold [TEKnew] to its existing mobile receivers
under its old local traﬃc encryption key. Hence, the new
member cannot retrieve the old traﬃc encryption key.
Similarly, an evicted mobile host cannot obtain any new
group key because its MSSi updates the subnet encryption
key-SEK. MSSi then multicasts the encrypted new traﬃc
encryption key and MSS’s priority number—ESSK1[TEKnew,
MSSpri], . . . , ESSKi [TEKnew, MSSpri] to its only remaining
mobile receivers. Thus, the evicted member cannot retrieve
the new traﬃc encryption key and he cannot know the new
traﬃc encryption key.
(2) Group data secrecy
Only group members owning the traﬃc encryption key (TEK)
can decrypt the group data. Multicast subnet stations cannot
get the group data and group data confidentiality is assured.
During the membership changes, all group members can
choose the same TEK from diﬀerent rekeying message and
start to use it at the next break point. Hence, the new mem-
bers and evicted members cannot access old and new group
data because they cannot retrieve the old and new group
keys.
3.3. CAMM: key distribution algorithms
In this section, we propose the key distribution algorithms
on centralized architecture for mobile multicast (CAMM)
on IPv6. In this scenario, multicast subnet stations (MSSi)
are not trusted and used to assist in enforcing the secure
multicast group without having any access to the multicast
data. We propose key distribution algorithms regarding four
operations: group creation, member join, member leave, and
multicast data distribution. The physical architecture and
components are similar to the one described in Section 3, for
DAMM refer to Figure 1.
3.3.1. Group creation
Group creation is similar to the one described in Section
3.2.1.
(1) Initial key distribution
In Step 1, MKD generates a random number as a traﬃc en-
cryption key (TEK). It then encrypts its signed TEK, pub-
lic key, and secret key (SM) with MSSi’s public key. Then
MKD sends this encrypted message to the multicast subnet
stations.
In Step 2, the corresponding MSS decrypts it with its
private key and stores the MKD’s public key and secret
key (SM). Then MSS reencrypts the message that includes
sender’s signed TEK, public key, local subnet encryption key,
and unique secret key (SK) under the public keys of eachmo-
bile receiver and sends it to each mobile receiver within their
subnets. Then MKD updates the group control list (GCL).
Step 1.
MKD⇒MSSi : EPKUMSSi [SKRMKD[TEK], KUMKD, SM].
(7)
Step 2.
MSSi ⇒MHi : EPKUMHi [SKRMKD[TEK], KUMKD, SEKi, SKi].
(8)
Each mobile receiver decrypts the TEK, MKD’s public
key, subnet encryption key-SEK, and unique secret key (SK)
with their corresponding private keys and MKD’s public key.
3.3.2. New member join
This operation is concerned with a mobile host wishing to
become a member of a multicast group. It includes two steps:
source-level subscription and subnet-level subscription.
(1) Source-level subscription
In Step 1, when a new mobile host wants to join the mul-
ticast group, it sends the join request message that includes
its capability certificate to multicast subnet station (MSS).
Next, MSS forwards MH’s capability certificate to multicast
key distributor MKD.
In Step 2, MKD verifies MH’s capability certificate. If the
member is legitimate, MKD generates a random number as
a traﬃc encryption key (TEK) and encrypts its signed TEK,
its public key, and f(SM) with new MH’s public key. Then,
MKD sends this encrypted message to MSS. Next, MSS only
forwards it to the new mobile host. MKD updates the group
control list (GCL).
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Step 1.
MHnew ⇒MSS : CCMHnew,
MSS⇒MKD : CCMHnew. (9)
Step 2.
MKD⇒MSS : EPKUMHnew[SKRMKD[TEK], KUMKD, f(SM)],
MSS⇒MHnew : EPKUMHnew[SKRMKD[TEK], KUMKD, f(SM)].
(10)
(2) Subnet-level subscription
In Step 1, the new mobile host requests the subnet encryp-
tion key (SEK) from its corresponding MSS by sending its
capability certificate and encrypted f(SM) after receiving the
traﬃc encryption key (TEK). Encrypted hash code f(SM) lets
MSSi know that the new mobile host has received the traﬃc
encryption key (TEK) from MKD. Then, MSSi authenticates
the new MH’s certificate and computes its own f(SM).
In Step 2, if authentication is successful and the com-
puted f(SM) equals MH’s presented f(SM), MSS encrypts its
signed new subnet key (SEKnew) and secret key (SKi) with
new MH’s public key and sends it to new mobile host. Ver-
ification of f(SM) shows that the new joining mobile node
has received the traﬃc encryption key (TEK) from MKD.
To guarantee the backward secrecy, MSS then multicasts the
encrypted key change message—ESSEKold [KC-Msg] to its ex-
isting members. Each mobile receiver decrypts the KC-Msg
and updates the subnet encryption key (SEK) by passing the
key data through a randomly generated function in the key
change message (Table 4).
Step 1.
MHnew ⇒MSS : CCMH, EPKRMHnew[f(SM)]. (11)
Step 2.
MSS⇒MHnew : EPKUMHnew[SKRMSS [SEKnew, SKi]],
MSS⇒MHi : ESSEKold [KC-Msg].
(12)
The format of key change message used in mobile join
and leave operations are shown in Table 4. The function type
field in the key change message comprises four randomly
generated functions based on SEK: 00 for hash function, 01
for 4 bits left shift, 10 for no operation, and 11 for 4 bits right
shift. The key version included in a key change message is in-
creased whenever MSS wants to update its subnet encryption
key (SEK) on join and leave operations.
3.3.3. Member leave operation
It is also possible that some mobile members may want to
leave from the multicast group either voluntarily or compul-
sorily. For the first case, a mobile host sends a member leave
request to the corresponding MSS. To guarantee the forward
secrecy for both cases, MSS updates its local subnet encryp-
tion key (SEK) and sends the encrypted key change mes-
sage to its remaining mobile receivers. Each of the mobile
Table 3: CAMM assigned keys.
Keys Owner Shared user
SM, KUKD MKD MSS
TEK, KUKD MKD MHi
KUMSS MSS MKD
SEKi, SKi MSS MHi
KUMH MH MKD
Table 4: Key change message.
2 bits 16 bits
Node identifier Function type Key version
receivers decrypts the key change message with its respec-
tive shared secret keys (SKi) and updates the local subnet key
(SEK) by passing the key data through the randomly gener-
ated key change functions. Group control list (GCL) is up-
dated on both MKD and MSS whenever a mobile host joins
and/or leaves the multicast group.
Step 1.
MHleave ⇒MSS : ESSKi [LEAVE]. (13)
Step 2.
MSS⇒MHi : ESSK1[KC-Msg], . . . , ESSKi [KC-Msg].
(14)
3.3.4. Handover process
Handover process in DAMM is similar to the one described
in Section 3.2.4
3.3.5. Multicast data distribution
When a sender multicasts the group data (M) encrypted
with a traﬃc encryption key-TEK first and then reencrypted
with the corresponding subnet encryption key (SEK)-
ESSEK[ESTEK[M]]. All mobile receivers of the multicast group
with TEK and the corresponding local subnet key (SEK) can
decrypt the multicast data.
CAMM’s keys assigned to MKD, MSS, and MH are
shown in Table 3.
3.3.6. Security analysis on CAMM
In this section, we discuss group key security and group data
secrecy on CAMM.
(1) Group key security
During the traﬃc encryption key distribution phase in
Section 3.2.1(1), an opponent may substitute the encrypted
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message—EPKUMHi [SKRMKD[TEK], KUMKD, SEKi, SKi]. How-
ever, the opponent would be extremely diﬃcult to alter the
message without knowing the mobile host’s private key and
only MKD could create the signed TEK-SKRMKD[TEK]. In ad-
dition, traﬃc data encryption key (TEK) is providing both
the authentication function and confidentiality by a double
use of the public key scheme. Thus, this attack fails.
A new join member cannot obtain the old subgroup key
because its MSSi updates the local subnet encryption key
(SEK). MSSi then encrypts its signed new subnet encryption
key (SEKnew) and secret key (SKi) with the new mobile host’s
public key—EPKUMHnew [SKRMSS [SEKnew, SKi]] and sends it to
the new mobile host. Then MSSi multicasts the encrypted
key change message—ESSEKold [KC-Msg] to its existing mem-
bers under its old local subgroup key. Hence, the new mem-
ber cannot retrieve the old local subgroup key.
Similarly, an evicted mobile host cannot obtain any new
group key because its MSSi updates the subnet encryption
key-SEK. MSSi then multicasts the encrypted key change
message—ESSK1[KC-Msg], . . ., ESSKi [KC-Msg] to its only re-
maining mobile receivers. Thus, the evicted member cannot
retrieve the key change message and he cannot know the new
local subgroup key.
(2) Group data secrecy
Only group members (receivers) owning the corresponding
local subnet key (SEK) and the traﬃc encryption key (TEK)
can decrypt the group data. Multicast subnet stations can-
not get the group data because they have no traﬃc encryp-
tion key (TEK). When a new mobile host joins the group,
the corresponding MSS updates its local subnet key. MSSi
then sends (SEKi)new to the new mobile host and distributes
the encrypted key change message to its existing mobile re-
ceivers. Thus the new joining member cannot get the pre-
vious (old) group data because the old group data is en-
crypted as ESSEKold [ESTEK[M]]. He cannot know (SEK)old.
This achieves backward secrecy.
Similarly, when a mobile host leaves the group, the cor-
responding MSSi distributes the encrypted key change mes-
sage to its remaining members. The leaving member can-
not retrieve the future group data because it is encrypted-
[ES(SEK)new [ESTEK(M)]]. He knows only TEK and (SEK)old
keys. This achieves forward secrecy.
4. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
4.1. Comparative analysis of DAMM with FT-MSS
In this section, we provide a comparative analysis of pro-
posed scheme (DAMM) with fully trusted mobile support sta-
tions (FT-MSS) in [8]. Both schemes use the public and se-
cret key systems to achieve scalable and secure key distribu-
tion. We compare the performance evaluation of these two
scenarios based on storage requirements, new member join,
member leave, and rekeying operations.
DAMM
(i) As we presented the initial key distribution in Section
3.2.1(1), the number of keys stored at an MSS depends on
the number of mobile hosts within a subnet. However, the
total keys stored at a mobile host are constant rather than
increasing in logarithmic growth in the number of mobile
hosts within the subnet.
(ii) In the case of a new member join in Section 3.2.2,
MSS sends only one transmission to a new mobile host. The
steps used in the member join operation are described as fol-
lows:
(1) MHnew ⇒MSS : CCMHnew,
(2) MSS⇒MHnew : EPKUMHnew[TEKnew, SKnew, MSSpri],
(3) MSS⇒MHi, MSSi : ESTEKold [TEKnew].
(iii) In DAMM,MSS incurs less key decryption costs than
FT-MSS. Each mobile receiver also incurs less key decryp-
tion costs than ST-MSS. MSS needs only one time to en-
crypt and decrypt the traﬃc encryption key (TEK) and sub-
net encryption key (SEK) during the group data transmis-
sion. Each mobile host incurs only one key decryption cost
which is significantly reduced to retrieve the traﬃc encryp-
tion key (TEK) and unique secret key (SK). In this case, only
three transmissions are required to receive all the node keys.
(iv) In the case of member leave (Section 3.2.3), the cor-
responding MSS changes the traﬃc encryption key (TEK)
and encrypts TEKnew with the unique secret keys (SKi) of re-
maining mobile receivers and multicasts that information to
them. At the receiver side, each mobile host needs to decrypt
only one time to get the new TEK. The number of transmis-
sions required to rekey the mobile hosts within the subnet is
significantly reduced from 2(log M) to 2.
FT-MSS
In initial key distribution on fully trusted multicast support
stations (FT-MSS) in [8], the total keys stored at a mobile
host are increasing in logarithmic growth in the number of
mobile hosts within the subnet. The steps used in the mem-
ber join operation on fully trusted multicast support stations
are described as follows:
(1) MKD⇒MSS:ESSK[KEKi, TEKnew],
SKRMKD[EPKUMSS [SK]],
(2) MSS⇒MHnew : SKRMSS [EPKUMHnew[CEK]].
(i) In the case of a new member join, MSS incurs only
two key encryption costs compared to (N + 3) for DAMM.
Eachmobile receiver incurs the same decryption costs as with
DAMM.
(ii) MSS needs more encryption and decryption costs for
traﬃc encryption key (TEK) and cell encryption key (CEK)
during the group data transmission.
(iii) Eachmobile receiver incurs more decryption costs to
retrieve the traﬃc encryption key (TEK) and cell encryption
key (CEK). In this case, the number of transmissions depends
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on two times logarithmic growth in the number of multicast
support stations.
(iv) In the case of member leave, MSS changes its cell en-
cryption key (CEK) and key encryption keys (KEKi) that is
shared with other MSSi according to the centralized tree Ver-
saKey [14] to prevent MH from accessing the data traﬃc and
guarantee the traﬃc forward secrecy at cell level. The num-
ber of transmissions required to rekey the mobile receivers
depends on two times logarithmic growth in the number of
multicast support stations.
4.2. Comparative analysis of CAMM with ST-MSS
In this section, we provide a comparative analysis of pro-
posed scheme (CAMM) with semi-trusted mobile support sta-
tions (ST-MSS) in [8]. Both schemes use the public and se-
cret key systems to achieve scalable and secure key distribu-
tion. We compare the performance evaluation of these two
scenarios regarding storage requirements, new member join,
member leave, and rekeying operations.
CAMM
(i) As we presented initial key distribution in Section
3.3.1(1), the total keys stored at a mobile host are constant
rather than increasing in logarithmic growth in the number
of mobile hosts within the subnet. The number of keys stored
at an MSS is also constant.
(ii) In the case of a new member join described in
Section 3.3.2, MKD sends only one transmission to a mo-
bile host. The steps used in the member join operation are
described as follows:
(1) MHnew ⇒MKD : CCMHnew,
(2) MKD ⇒ MHnew : EPKUMHnew[SKRMKD[TEK], KUMKD,
f(SM)],
(3) MHnew ⇒MSS : CCMHnew, EPKRMHnew[f(SM)],
(4) MSS⇒MHnew : EPKUMHnew [SKRMSS [SEKnew, SKi]],
(5) MSS⇒MHi : ESSEKold [KC-Msg].
(iii) In CAMM, MSS incurs less key encryption costs
than ST-MSS. Each mobile receiver incurs less key decryp-
tion costs than ST-MSS. The new mobile receiver has to de-
crypt four times to get the traﬃc encryption key (TEK) and
subnet encryption key (SEK). From the security viewpoint,
both TEK and SEK are providing both the authentication
function and confidentiality by a double use of the public key
scheme [15]. The number of transmissions is reduced from
2(log M) to 5.
(iv) In the case of member leave (Section 3.3.3), the cor-
responding MSS changes its local subnet key and encrypts
the key change message—ESSK1[KC-Msg], . . . , ESSKi[KC-
Msg] with the shared secret keys of all mobile receivers and
multicasts that information to them. At the receiver side,
each mobile host needs only one symmetric key decryption
time. The number of transmissions required to rekey the
mobile hosts within the subnet is significantly reduced from
2(log M) to 1.
ST-MSS
(i) In initial key distribution on semi-trusted mobile support
stations (ST-MSS) in [8], the total keys stored at amobile host
are increasing in logarithmic growth. The number of keys
stored at an MSS depends on the number of mobile hosts
under an MSS control.
(ii) The steps used in the member join operation on
semi-trusted multicast support stations are described as fol-
lows:
(1) MHnew ⇒MSS : SKRMHnew[JOIN],
(2) MSS⇒MKD : SKRMHnew[JOIN],
(3) MKD⇒MSS : SKRMKD [EPKUMHnew[TEK]],
(4) MSS⇒MHnew : SKRMKD [EPKUMHnew[TEK]],
(5) MSS⇒MHnew : SKRMSS [EPKUMHnew[SM]], ESSM[CEK],
(6) MSS ⇒ MHi : SKRMSS [EPKUMHi [SM]], ESSM[new keys
from leaf to root].
(iii) In the case of a new member join, MSS incurs more
key encryption costs than CAMM. Each mobile receiver in-
curs more key decryption costs than CAMM. In member
join, the number of transmissions depends on two times log-
arithmic growth in the number of multicast support stations.
(iv) In the case of member leave, MSS changes its cell
encryption key (CEK) to prevent MH from accessing the
data traﬃc and guarantee the traﬃc forward secrecy at cell
level. In this case, multicast cell stations apply the centralized
tree VersaKey [14]. The number of transmissions required to
rekey the mobile receivers depends also on two times loga-
rithmic growth in the number of multicast support stations.
4.3. Tabular comparison
In this section, we summarize the merits and shortcom-
ings of a comparative analysis between DAMM and FT-MSS,
as well as CAMM and ST-MSS shown in Table 5. A value
written in bold is the best value for a certain row. All sce-
narios use both public and secret key systems to achieve
scalable and secure key distribution scheme. The scalabil-
ity problem of group key management for a large group
with frequent joins and leaves in wireless network was pre-
viously addressed by [8] which applies centralized versa key
(CVK) scheme [14]. In all these schemes, the session key
is modified each time a mobile host joins and leaves. In
comparing the two approaches, there are several issues to
consider: performance, trust, and reliability. The main dif-
ference between CVK and our approach is in how the 1-
aﬀects-n-type problem [16] is addressed. In CVK, every
time a client joins/leaves the secure group, a rekeying op-
eration is required, which aﬀects the entire group and the
server cost is O(log(N)). In CAMM, there is no globally
shared group key with the apparent advantage that when-
ever a client joins/leaves a subnet, only the subnet needs to
be rekeyed.
Although our scenarios DAMM and CAMM incur more
key storage at the sender, they have less key storage at MSS
and mobile receivers. In our approach, DAMM incurs only
one encryption and decryption operation on each mobile
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Table 5: Comparison of secure one-to-many multicast protocols (N: no. of participating mobile receivers, M: no. of multicast subnet
stations, M′: no. of mobile hosts under MSS control).
Criteria FT-MSS [8] DAMM ST-MSS [8] CAMM
No. of keys managed by the sender O(log M) M+1 M+1 M+2
No. of keys stored at the sender M+1 M+2 N+M+1 N+M+2
No. of keys stored at an MSS M′ M′ +1 M′ 4
No. of keys stored at a member O(log M′) 3 O(log M′) 5
Total key encryptions at the sender 3 2 2 2
Total key encryptions at the MSS 2 N+3 6 3
Total key decryptions at the MSS 3 2 0 1
Total key decryptions at a member 2 2 5 4
Total session key encryptions at sender 3 0 2 2
Total session key encryptions at an MSS 2 1 0 0
Total session key decryptions at an MSS 3 1 0 0
Total session key decryptions at a member 2 1 2 2
No. of messages at join O(log M′+log M) O(1) O(1) O(1)
No. of messages at leave O(log M′+log M) O(1) O(1) O(1)
Total messages on member join 2(log M) 3 2(log M) 5
Total messages on member leave 2(log M) 1 2(log M) 1
One aﬀects n scalability Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intermediate nodes (trusted?) Yes Yes No No
Forward secrecy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Backward secrecy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public key/ secret key Both Both Both Both
receiver that must be performed in order to access the group
key used to encrypt the data traﬃc.
Both DAMM and CAMM reduce the total number of
messages transmitted during the membership changes from
2(log M) to two transmissions. Our approach is very de-
sirable from the viewpoint of transmission savings since an
eﬃcient rekeying mechanism is provided for membership
changes. In addition, proposed protocols ensure the forward
secrecy and backward secrecy and provide for transmission
eﬃciency. In particular, they achieve better performance than
ST-MSS and FT-MSS.
5. CONCLUSION
The main focus of the key management approach and tech-
niques proposed in this paper is to make better provision
for securely distributing the group key and rekey messages
for joining and leaving a mobile host in a secure multicast
group. We provided the security analysis and performance
comparisons between our approach and the scenarios in [8].
All scenarios apply both public and secret key cryptosys-
tems in order to achieve the security advantages of public key
cryptosystem and speed advantages of secret key cryptosys-
tems. They all ensure the forward secrecy and backward se-
crecy, confidentiality, authentication, and message integrity.
The benefits of our proposed technique are that it minimizes
the number of transmissions required to rekey the multicast
group and it imposes minimal storage requirements on the
multicast group. In our approach, dynamic architecture for
mobile multicast (DAMM) is very desirable from the view-
point of transmission overhead since an eﬃcient rekeying
mechanism is provided for membership changes. In addi-
tion, it ensures the forward secrecy, backward secrecy and
provides transmission eﬃciency. Centralized architecture for
mobile multicast (CAMM) also achieves robust against col-
lusion of excluded users with generating fresh keys, and send-
ing them to members securely. Our proposed protocols sig-
nificantly reduce the communication burden associated with
key updating.
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